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THE NATIVE ADMINISTRATIONS OF MACGREGOR, 
MURRAY AND HASLUCK IN PAPUA/NEW GUINEA: 
CONTINUITY AND CONTRAST.
by Christine Oke
There are good reasons for making a comparative study of 
the native administrations of MacGregor, Murray and Hasluck in 
Papua New Guinea. Each man was responsible for the colony in 
a crucial stage of its history: the initial period of British 
control, the consolidation of Australian rule, and the post-war 
period of general decolonization. Each man ruled for at least 
a decade, Murray for the remarkable length of thirty-four years, 
and each man more-or-less centralized policy-making in himself 
(although the process of joint control by the government of 
Queensland nnd the Colonial Office restricted MacGregor’s 
freedom in decisions concerning policy to a large degree).
Such an approach, however, raises serious problems of 
methodology, as each man worked in very different times. 
Obviously, it is reasonable to expect a greater understanding
of indigenous societies and concepts of indirect rula from 
Murray, who worked when anthropology became a recognized 
atudy, and when men such as Lord Lugard in Nigeria were 
practising indirect rule, then from MacGregor whose 
administration was established when ideas of indirect rule 
were still fluid and Victorian attitudes to race prevailed, (1) 
Hasluck, too, must be assessed in the context of the rapid 
decolonization of his time. This essay attempts to assess 
each man's native administration within the context of the 
ideas and prejudices held at the time, yet argues that a 
basis continuity exists which makes a comparison valuable.
MacGregor's experience under Gordon in Fiji encouraged 
him to try and set up a system of indirect rule in British 
New Guinea. Essentially, this involved the establishment of 
institutions by which a rapprochement could be made between 
native and British concepts of law through effective 
consultation. He was greatly handicapped in this aim by 
his tiny allowance of £15,000 a year, by his small, rough
and untrained staff who had to be constantly prevented from
( 2)mistreating natives, or replaced because of illness, and by 
his primary task of establishing law and order which forced 
him to place great importance upon the direct side of native 
administration, native police and village constablesNot 
only was there continual pressure upon him by the Queensland 
government to rapidly open up areas for settlement, but the 
activities of both miners and missionaries forced him to 
keep extending his administration, leaving him little time to
consolidate it or adopt more sophistccated methods. Once an 
area was pacified, moreover, it had to be protected from 
attacks by warring tribes from the uncontrolled hill areas: 
another incentive to direct action. (5)
UacGregor was further limited in his work by the segmentarj 
lineage nature of Ken Guinean society and by its division into 
small tribes which lacked traditional hereditary chiefs who 
could be formally invested with government power. He wrote 
of New Guinea;
HIt does not seem to have ever produced a man capable 
of uniting the inhabitants of two contiguous glens". (6)
This did not deter him, however, and his system of Government
Chiefs which he hoped to use "in such a way that before long
(7)
they may assume some of the functions of government" and of 
Village Constables whom he said were "the best substitute that
can be created in the place of tribal chiefs that do not
(8'exist in Hew Guinea" slowly spread. In 1889 he reported;
"Endeavours have been made to strengthen the position 
of a number of leading men in certain tribes, so as 
to increase their authority and to put on them some 
responsibility towards the Government. A certain 
amount of progress has been made, but great patience 
is required, and it will be long before the position 
of any chief is sufficiently strong and authoritative 
to make him an efficient government officer". (9)
By his Ordinance for the Better Regulation of Native 
Affairs of 1889, liacGregor hoped to further his system of 
indirect rule. The Native Regulations Board would codify 
native law in simple terms, and the Native Magistrates Courts 
would make native custom a recognized part of the judicial 
processi ‘MacGregor hoped to have native members on these
3oardsf and thus they would be one means whereby native and
European concepts could be integrated. His hopes were
never fulfilled, largely because of the failure of the
native magistrate Bystem.
Two traditional Eiwai chiefs were appointed as
magistrates in 1890 by Cameron, the Resident Magistrate
( 1 1 )
for the Western division. The following year MacGregor
visited them and commented: "The two native magistrates 
have been more moderate, more just and better 
officers than could reasonably have been expected". (12)
Unfortunately, the new Resident Magistrate, Hely, thought
differently. It is obvious that he did not understand the
role conflict situation in which the magistrates were placed,
and regarded them as village constables. He criticized one
of them in his 1892 Report:
"Not a single person in Gamia's village has ever 
been brought before me by him, though I don't 
doubt that there has been cause". (1 3 )
The following year he suspended Gamia for "tampering with
(14)
women and doing much damage to government influence". He alBo
called the second native magistrate "weak, and absurdly
(15)frightened of 'puri puri"'. KacGregor was faced with 
accepting Hely's judgement, or upholding his hope for the 
native magistrate system and losing the goodwill of one of 
his best officers. He made no comment on Hely's action.
ICacGregor's native policy was both paternalistic and 
humanitarian: his concern for the well-being of the natives 
determined his attitude to all other matters. KacGregor had
to
great respect for the natives and held high hopes for them:
"the Papuans possess an aptitude for tuition which 
cannot but appear to he extroardinary to any person 
acquainted with the history of civilization among 
the present existing cultured races of this globe.
If the Papuans are allowed anything like a reasonable 
time they will become a very important unit in the 
Australian dominions of the Queen". (16)
Although he believed that the British civilization was the
most advanced, he did not follow an assimilationist policy
aimed at converting natives into British gentlemen, because
he recognized the inherent worth of native culture. He
believed that only when his officers understood native cultur#
and languages, so that true consultation could be undertaken,
(17)would administration be effective. He therefore spent as much
time trying to grasp native customs and to meet as many of the
tribes as he could. A missionary wrote of him in 1890:
"He spends his whole life in studying the natives and 
endeavouring to understand their peculiarities". (18)
Historians have characterized MacGregor as far from
sympathetic towards the natives. Lucy Hair wrote in 1948 "He
believed in the punitive expedition" and Peter Hastings has
(19)supported this interpretation. MacGregor’s expeditions,
however, were essentially administrative and pacificatory,
and he took great personal risks on them to inspire confidence
in the Government among the natives. MacGregor expressly
avoided the use of force on an expedition except for self
defence, as his remarks to Cameron show:
"Instead of organising hostile parties Mr. Cameron 
should visit the country of the different tribes 
and leave for them or give them presents; influence 
them to visit the station and coast tribes. This 
will require tact and patience; but this is the
only policy which will meet my approval.
Recourse to force is justifiable only in 
self-defence'*. (20)
MacGregor's comments reveal his humaneness. His concern for
native welfare determined his ideas of justice, as is shown in
the Ancell case.
MacGregor realized that a great number of people were 
implicated in the crime. Instead of following the gunboat 
diplomacy of the past, however, he took great pains to capture 
the actual murderers. He wrote:
"I ai extremely anxious that punishment for the 
murder should overtake the actual perpetrators 
which would have a great effect on these people, 
especially if the penalty were carried out in 
their own locality. A general punishment 
inflicted on the natives of the district, such 
as fining them, burning their houses end driving 
them to the bush, will never, I fear, stop these 
murderous attacks". (21)
MacGregor thus substituted the British notion of individual
responsibility for crime for the previous notion under the
Protectorate of punishment of a whole trib9. At the same
time he tried to impress the local people with the power
of the Government by his action, and held all of them
responsible for capturing the murderers and preventing
further outbreaks. The execution of the murderers, MacGregor
realized, was a compromise between British and native notions
of justice, as it would represent 'payback' in the eyes of
the natives for the murder of Ancell. After this, there were
only two natives executed, and MacGregor caxefully explained
that this was because:
"the crime was of a kind that is neither justified nor 
excused by native customs or prejudice". (22)
MacGregor’s respect for indigenous standards of justice 
induced him to follow such a path. (2 3)
MacGregor's respect for native culture and his 
reluctance to interfere with native society can be seen 
in his careful justification of the laws against adultery, 
home burial and sorcery that such practices led to payback 
murders which in the interests of law and order had to be 
prevented, (24). His protective Ordinance by which he 
prohibited the sale of alcohol, opium and firearms to 
natives was stringently followed, and established a 
precedent which was continued by the Australian administration 
(for so long that it became no longer applicable as a 
protective measure and merely perpetuated out-dated 
paternalism and discrimination). (2 5)
The failure of the experiment in native magistrates 
in effect meant that MacGregor gave up his aim of carrying 
out a system of indirect rule in British New Guinea. Why 
did he give up so easily? Perhaps in view of the circum­
stances under which he worked it is remarkable that he 
attempted it at all. However, it is likely that his 
Victorian prejudices and assumptions, which conflicted with 
his concern for native culture, and which KacGregor never 
Beamed to resolve himself, were a determining factor in his 
precipitate retreat from his aim of indirect rule.
£!acGregor constantly spoke of his aim in New Guinea as 
a "civilizing mission" (26), and it is evident that he did 
not see this ae incompatible with the continuance of native
13
culture, I would disagree with Joyce, then, when he 
characterizes MacGregor as ignoring the problem:
"Did MacGregor ever envisage how European and 
Papuan cultures would be reconciled? He 
realised his measures were changing native 
lives, but overwhelmed by day to day affairs 
he probably regarded this as a future problem". (27)
MacGregor saw little incompatibility, as he restricted his
"civilizing" to Westernizing a native elite (28) who would
then participate in native administration, while at the
village level he believed traditional life would be little
affected. Thus native oulture and customs would co-exist
with a western-educated, Christian and English-speaking elite.
He believed that such a process of "civilizing" could only
occur gradually so that native society would undergo minimum
stress. (29)
MacGregor never resolved exactly what he meant by "savage" 
or "civilized", never defined exactly what in native society he 
hoped to alter, and these words reveal his Victorian prejudices 
and assumptions. This confusion led to contradictions in his 
politics in some areas, as his behaviour in the Trobriands shows.
MacGregor believed that it was his duty to encourage the 
Missions in British New Guinea as, apart from the Constabulary 
(30) they were the chief agents of civilization. He wrote:
"To encourage mission wort: in every way possible was 
considered a sacred duty by the government. To not 
do eo would, indeed, have been a complete departure 
from the principle on which British colonization 
-’irst originated”. (31)
As MacGregor relied almost entirely on the missions in aesy 
areas to spread knowledge of the government, he was greatly 
dependent on their goodwill, and it is understandable that 
he held this view.
The Methodist mission had wanted land in Kevataria on the 
Trobriands, and MacGregor seems to have deliberately set out 
to intimidate the chief of this tribe, Enamakala, in ortier to 
force him to agree to this. (32) MacGregor recognized 
Enamakala's standing as a chief, and tried to weaken his 
authority, because he had refused to surrender his land to 
the mission, (33) Not only did he interfere .with his land 
rights, but with hi3 domestic life, by reprimanding him for 
practising polygyny. (34) It is likely that MacGregor's 
behaviour in the Trobriands resulted from 3heer exhaustion 
due to overwork, or disappointment with his previous 
experiments in indirect rule, or uncertainty as to the 
future, but this remains as one instance in which his 
behaviour was, quite untypically, dominated by his 
Victorian prejudices, and not by his concern with native 
welfare.
MacGregor's economic policy incorporated both his a*™ 
of preserving native culture and that of spreading 
"civilization". Initially he opposed amall scale white 
settlement in New Guinea because he believed that it would 
have endangered native society, and his land policy, by 
its protective restrictions, effectively prevented it. (35) 
Partly this stemmed from his medical experience in Fiji. (36)
He hoped, however, to encourage native economic 
development and encouraged natives to participate in 
a cash economy by planting coconuts for export. (37)
He saw this change as additional to traditional subsistence 
cultivation, and believed that it would not interfere 
■eriously with village life. (38) MacGregor wanted 
■estern-style economic development in the form of large 
Companies such as Bums-Philp, whom he believed would be 
tetter financed and thus more viable than small, private 
settlements, as well as better from the point of view of 
relations with the natives. He saw this development as 
co-existing with and complementing native life.
Unlike MacGregor, Murray (1907-40) had the benefit 
of a secure and slowly-increasing Australian grant, and 
almost complete freedom in policy-making. In practice, he 
rejected MacGregor's aim of indirect rule for a direct 
police rule which was based on law and order. Why did he 
do 80?
The constant need to pacify new areas dominated Murray's 
attitude to natives in already settled areas which can be 
summarized as extreme paternalism coupled with distrust.
Eie native could never be trusted as
"at times the primitive instinct is too strong even 
for the returned labourers, and cases have occurred 
where natives who have been working on the 
plantations, who have at least the chance of 
picking up some idea of civilization, have, on 
their return to their villages, been guilty of 
acts of utter savagery". (39)
lb
Hurray's most common observation on Papuans was their 
readiness to accept Western customs and their obedience 
to authority characteristics which he regarded as 
advantageous as they made the native amenable to plantation 
work! Ge wrote:
"The natives of Papua are far from being a stupid 
race, nor do they altogether fail to appreciate 
the advantages of peace t and when they have grown 
more or less familiar with our ideas of civilization, 
they become law abiding and, not infrequently, 
industrious people". (40)
This attitude assumed the innate inferiority of the natives,
»nii the automatic suitability of the whites to rule: as late
as 1938 he wrote;
"I thirty that the best Papuans are superior to the 
worst Europeans, but that Europeans as a whole have 
an innate superiority over Papuans". (41)
Hurray’s belief in the inferiority of the natives meant 
that they could never be given any responsibility:
"I do net thinV that we should attempt to give the 
Papuans anything in the nature of a higher 
education; nor do I think that we should ever 
dream of conferring upon him any political rights.
Ke is inferior to the European, and, if we wish 
to avoid trouble, we should never look upon him as 
a social and political equal". (42)
Hurray's native policy reflected his concept of civil­
ization. "Civilization" was equated with the Australian, 
Christian lifestyle and was regarded as the ultimate aim of 
native policy; "savagery" was equated with the present 
state of native life, with all its customs which militated 
against western values. Murray believed that the ultimate 
aim of native policy was "civilizing" the natives, by which 
he meant imposing on them the Australian way of life at the
village level. Such a policy of grassroots assimilation 
assumed that native culture was totally inferior, It 
therefore meant a radical departure from MacGregor's 
precedents, despite Murray's assertions that he was 
following the "spirit of Indirect Rule", as it denied 
the inherent worth of native institutions. No native 
participation in government could he allowed even when 
total assimilation had taken place, because of the 
insurmountable difficulty posed by native innate inferiority. 
Kurray even regarded the Village Constable system as 
dangerous, and revealed'his distrust of the natives when 
he wrote:
"Members of the Armed Constabulary have their faults, 
and some of these are rather serious; they are 
capable, for instance, of extortion and blackmail 
if they are not watched, and they are, to put it 
mildly, somewhat addicted to gallantry". (43)
Native administration became a rudimentary administrative
device, And a system of police rule came into being, with
white men holding an judicial, legislative and executive
powers.
Hurray's ideas of justice were based on the assumption 
that Australian law was superior to native law, which was 
barbaric, and that it should therefore be imposed on the 
natives. Instead of pursuing MacGregor's aim of codifying 
native law, Murray believed that native custom should b*
allowed for by concessions as to punishment:
"We must not forget that it is our social custoa 
and law, and not that of the primitives, that 
will eventually survive. So what we regard a* 
crime must be suppressed, even though it is 
committed under the aegis of native custom”.
As no native could have an understanding of Australian
legal systems, this belief prohibited native participation
in the judicial system:
"I do not know of any part of Papua in which a native 
administration of justice could be introduced with 
any prospect but the certainty of complete failure". (45)
To Murray, "failure" to imitate Australian legal processes
was certain, and his refusal to recognise indigenous
processes prevented any alternative. He reported one
instance where it had been attempted in the Mekeo district:
"The Councillors formed themselves into a District 
Court Martial and tried and convicted a man on a 
charge of owning a dilapidated house. Such a 
charge is, in fact, unknown to the law but this 
did not deter the so-called Court from sentencing 
him - i) to be flogged, ii) to have his hair cut 
short, iii) to have his aralets taken from him, 
iv) to be imprisoned for three months in Kairuku 
gaol. Such zeal was obviously embarrassing and 
the members of the Court Martial were appropriately 
dealt with". (46)
Hurray did not discern here an obvious need on the part of
the Council to have some judicial powers operating within
a traditional context, but held it up as an example of the
disaster he felt would ensue if they did.
When Kative Assessors were eventually created in 1932, they
were intended, not to be trained in Western legal procedures
so that they could eventually become magistrates but only to
relieve the workload of European magistrates by doing some of
the hackwork, Murray's long-term aims wer6 severely limited.
He hoped that:
"In the future, perhaps only in the very distant future, 
we shall be able to hand over petty acts of administration 
and trivial native cases to Papuans". (47)
IS
Murray retained the system of village constables whj 
tended to create role conflict where the constable had 
traditional authority; produce nonentities who had no 
real authority in the village; alienate villagers from 
the government as it denied consultation; and force 
indigenous lan underground. (48) It gave natives no 
responsibility in the running of their country.
The belief in Papuan inferiority led to a polioy of 
gradual extension of native responsibility to fourth-clas 
roles in administration. Murray wrote in 1924:
"I think we are justified in expecting that in anotk 
generation the lower positions in the Goveracent 
service will be largely filled by native. I do not 
think taat they will be capable of filling any of t! 
higher positions until they have developed a sense i 
responsibility which so far has hardly been awakenei
(49)
It was partly for this reason that Eurray opposed educatii 
higher than a leve] of basic literacy, for he held that i 
would create a Papuan intelligentsia which could not be 
employed because of the "colour bar" to positions. (50) I 
however, maintained this discrimination in his own Public 
Service! This was the reverse cf MacGregor's aim of 
encouraging a native elite by education and participation 
in government.
Hurray's system of native taxation and native plantai 
introduced in 1918 as a "variety of the Dutch 'culture' sj
(5 1) (abandoned by the Dut.ch in 1870!) meant that native 
participation was required to a previously unknown degree.
Hurray therefore appointed village councillors supposedly 
to act as agents who would explain to the natives how 
benevolent the government's apparently dictatorial measures 
were*
"There are two main difficulties in native administration 
i) that we do not always understand the natives, ii) 
that they understand us very much less. The Councillors 
can assist, especially, in surmounting this second 
difficulty. It is possible for the magistrates to 
explain to the Councillors that we really have a 
consistent policy, and that it is intended to be 
for the assistance of the natives generally - that 
the tax, for instance, does not go into the pockets 
of the tax collectors, but goes to pay for medical 
attention, hospitals, schools, etc., and eventually 
all comes back to the native in one form or another.
T.hen once the Councillors have grasped this tfcey will 
have no trouble in explaining it to the rest of the 
village". (5 2)
Murray’s system of village councillors was a far cry from
KacGregor's attempts at native participation in government,
which aimed at ensuring a two-way relationship between the
natives and government. Hurray's councillors, intentionally,
had no real powers, (53) and were intended solely to disseminati
propaganda for already-determined government policies. The gap
between village and government values was widened in the effort
to impose the latter on the former. No wonder Murray complainet
"Some of them cannot get it out of their heads that 
they are not village constables”. (54)
Not only did Murray reject the precedents set by KacGregor 
but he ignored the example of men such as Gordon in Fiji arm 
lugard in Africa, as he wrongly maintained that Papua was 
unique in having no systems of chieftains or rank and no 
clearly defined native law through which to work. He ?/rote:
"In the details of our native administration we have
been under the disadvantages of having no precedents 
to follow. There were of course precedents in 
Africa and in Asia, but the conditions of Papua 
were so different that one had to be careful how 
one followed these precedents. Of Lugard'3 
'Th-3 Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa' I 
have found but little in the book that can be of 
direct assistance in the administration of Papua". (55
In fact, as West has pointed out, Murray simply could 
not grasp the nature of indirect rule, but believed that it 
meant
"to conserve such of those customs as appear to be 
useful or harmless, and make use of them, so far as 
may be, as an instrument of good government". (56)
Murray believed that he was following direct rule, simply
because he did not interfere with all native custom!
Murray's attitude to the natives determined his 
educational policy, which was entirely primary and technical 
and run by the missions, and by 1940 was appallingly backwar 
compared with other colonial countries. (57) In administra 
it created a vicious circle of lack of Papuan opportunities 
for higher education, consequent lack of skilled educated 
Papuans who could accept responsible positions, leading to 
further categorizing by whites of the Papuan race as 
irresponsible, backward and illiterate, and further 
unwillingness to allow Papuans any participation in the 
administration of their country.
Murray supported white settlement and believed that it 
would benefit the natives, firstly, because work on the whits 
men's plantations would overcome laziness and:
"If the natives won't work it appears to me that 
they are dooaed; idleness does not do them any 
more good than it does to white men". (58)
White settlement would also introduce the natives to the 
benefits of civilization:
"Every white man is in himself a centre of 
civilization which spreads gradually through 
the influence of local natives whom he employs, 
or with whom he comes into contact". (59)
Yet he realised that natives often suffered at the hands of
white settlers (60) and that plantation work necessitated
a destructioncf traditional native life. (61) Murray hoped
Papua would become a land of prosperous white plantations rur
by native labour, although he spoke of "native plantations"
run by the Government:
"You get a bit of land and make the natives cultivate 
it, you supplying seeds, tools, supervision, etc., 
then v.hen the crop is gathered you (that is, the 
Government) take a share or you can say, if you 
like, that it all belongs to the natives and make 
them sell to you at a price below the market price".
(62)
Murray's hope for "native plantations" was that they would only| 
develop the country where white plantations could not:
"I advocate it principally as a means of fully 
developing the territory - my point is that you 
should have not only capitalistic enterprise but 
also native cultivation as well - the latter to 
occupy places eg., in the mountains which it 
would not pay a European company to take up". (63)
Such an aim made no allowance for native participation in the
economy except as labour in private or government-run "native
plantations" and no encouragement was given to natives to
become entrepreneurs or owners of their own plantations.
Murray stated in 1906;
"The natives have been treated extremely well, 
perhaps too well. I think they have been placed 
on a pedestal for too long with absolutely no 
result". (64)
He then greatly relaxed MacGregor's protective ordinance 
on native labour and land acquisition, with the resulting 
massive increase in white settlement. (65) He was 
prevented in his original a.'tm to make all lands Crown Land, 
and allow compulsory purchase of land from natives. (66) 
Unlike MacGregor, who had eventually tried to encourage 
large-scale development by large companies, Murray preferred 
small settlement on the Australian model. (67) Murray's 
economic policy resulted in much land alienation and widespread 
denuding of villages of young men and a consequent strain on 
traditional village society. (68)
Hasluck's period as Minister for Territories saw a massive 
increase in the size of the Australian grant to Papua New 
Guinea (69), and a huge growth in the white bureaucracy there,
(70) at a time when other colonial countries were stepping up 
their preparations for independence in an era of ecolonization.
(71) Under Hasluck, too, authority was increasingly 
centralised in Canberra. Hasluck ruled, as Murray had done, 
as an autocrat (Y/hitlam called him a 'benevolent despot')(72), 
but his decisions were not formulated with any respect for 
local conditions, and became irrelevant to the actual 
circumstances in the Territory. Hasluck believed in the same 
assumptions as Murray, and continued his policies of direct
rule by white expatriates throughout his rule. His policies 
ensured that decolonization was greatly retarded; and he 
aimed at postponing independence indefinitely.
Hasluck justified his continuation of Murray's policies 
on the grounds that New Guinea was merely an extension of 
Australia:
"We cannot regard the Territory as a distant colony.
The Territory is no more remote from the national 
capital and the heart of the Australian population 
than the outlying states of the Commonwealth. Hence 
the administration of the territory can be in the 
clearest ana most direct sense an Australian 
administration, as distinguished from a colonial 
government". (7 3)
This meant that its interests were identical with those of
Australia (74), and its future lay with Australia, possibly
as a seventh state! Hasluck seemed to hold this notion when
he wrote:
"I envisage a future time when the people of Papua 
and New Guinea will seek self-government and 
SOME MEASURE OP independence". (75)
Hasluck argued, exactly e ls  Murray had done in rejecting
the.precedents of Lugard, that Papua New Guinea was unique
and couldn't be compared with other colonies,he spoke of:
"the error that is often made in talking about it as 
if it were some other place— as though it were an 
African colony, or a backward rural community, in the 
U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. Papua and New Guinea has its own 
characteristics and its own problems. We have to get 
out of the habit of thinking that every dependent 
area is like every other dependent area and that all 
primitive societies are identical. It is a unique 
situation, and mo3t of the comparisons that are 
sometimes made between the situation in Papua and 
New Guinea and situations that may have existed in 
the past in the newly-independ^nt countries in 
Asia and Africa are inexact". {76)
Hasluck, unlike Murray, never explained exactly how it was 
"unique”. His argument is not only illogical, muddling the 
crucial difference betwoen "like" and "identical", but false, 
as a piece such as ■‘•Vie Solomons Islands, for instance, was 
very similar to Papua New Guinea in topography, social 
structure, general lack of traditional hereditary leadership, 
and history. (77)
As the territory was only a part of Australia, Hasluck 
believed, it should conform culturally to the rest of 
Australia, and he was therefore justified in continuing 
Murray's policy of basic assimilation of the natives into 
the Australian way of life. Up to 1962 Hasluck was able to 
get away with such obviously backward ideas, because of the 
apathy of the Australian public and parliament with the 
Territory, (78) and because of the United Nations which was 
too concerned with decolonization in Africa to concentrate 
upon the Territory. The publication of the Foot Report (1962) 
coming as it did after Tanganyikan independence, meant that 
the Territory came under concentrated world attention for the 
first time: Hasluck resigned not long after.
Murray's gradualist statements are repeated in Hasluck's 
ministerial statements: He made it clear that he regarded 
independence as a far distant future aim, and that there was 
no need for urgency or of time running out in Australian 
policy. He wrote in 1958:
"For the next thirty years at least a large part of the 
task of the administration..will be the establishment 
and maintenance of law and order". (79)
T -lo
Hurray' 3 policy of basic assimilation, which assumed
the superiority of Australian civilization, was extended
by Hasluck into a precondition for independence. He wrote
"Before a Territory-wide political change can come 
about, the people will need to develop a sense of 
communication which is now lacking.. The common 
language will be English, as for a common stock 
of ideas, they will gain them from the teaching 
of Christianity, and the example and precept we 
give them in administration". (80)
New Guineans were to be united by accepting the Australian
lifestyle! Hasluck believed naively that it was still
possible for the natives to "preserve all that is best in
their cultural heritage" while becoming:
"a Papuan people, living at a common standard of 
material well being, and with a common culture, 
strongly influenced by Christian teaching and 
by Australian social, economic and political 
practice". (81)
At least Murray had been perceptive enough to realise that
assimilation was incompatible with the preservation of
native culture, and to accept that his policies should
eventually lead to its destruction when he wrote:
"It is true that in any case most of the old customs 
must go sooner or later..most of this custom and 
belief has no real social value". (82)
Hasluck's attitude to the natives was in essentials
identical to that of Murray. Although he nowhere stated
outright that he believed that the natives were innately
inferior to the white man, it is obvious that his policies
assumed this. Murray's refusal to allcw Papuans any
responsibility, his paternalism and his mistrust are
clear in such statements of Hasluck's as:
"Gradual transition has to be made from the stage 
at which a truly effective local council may come 
into being. There is not, at present, and cannot 
be for many yearB to come, any possibility of a 
Territory-wida franchise for native peoples". (83)
Hasluck's ideas of justice were identical to those held 
by Murray: he believed that Australian law and civilization 
were superior, and his view of indigenous law as barbaric 
underlay the policy of complete assimilation into the white 
man's judicial system. In 1955 he finally abandoned the 
Native Courts Ordinance (established by the Fapua-New 
Guinea Act of 1949) because, as the Annual Report stated:
"it is the policy of the Australian government to 
encourage the people to turn to the existing Btatutorj 
judicial system, which provides the highest measure oi 
justice". (84)
Hasluck, like Murray, believed in total assimilation with
allowance for ignorance of the white man's law with regard
to punishment:
"While there is nothing in the primitive way of life 
on which a council could build a system of justice 
which would be acceptable to the civilized world, 
yet there is a need in establishing our own system 
of justice to recognise that native custom and the 
compulsion of their own primitive culture may have 
to be taken into account in any measures taken 
within our system of justice". (85)
The direct opposite of such a policy was being applied in th
British Solomons where native courts were established in 194'
after a two jyear trial period, based on the recognition of tl
importance of native law and the need to integrate it with
the administration's judicial framework. (86)
Hasluck's uss of words such aa "primitive" »nd 
"civilised" indicated that his concept of civilisation 
was similar to that of Murray, and the same policies 
which assumed the innate inferiority of the natives were 
continued. Thus natives could not be given responsibility 
in such positions as magistrates in a white can's court 
(judging native cases) because they could never be 
"civilised" to the Bame level as a white man. Any 
attempt to train natives in Australian justice was 
dependent upon an educational policy which aimed at 
producing a group of natives who could undergo this 
training. This was not forthcoming, and native participation 
in the judicial system was postponed to the far distant 
future. (87) Such a gradualist policy was doomed to failure 
The split between indigenous and Australian law, which 
begun in Hurray's time, was not reconciled by a bridging 
institution such as a native courts system, with the result 
that natives continued their own system of justice undergroua 
(88) The consequences of the alienation of natives from the 
law of the land are now obvious in recent discontent with 
land rifgits in the territory.
Under Hasluck the system of native local government 
councils was slowly introduced, although the allowance in 
the 1949 Act for native advisory councils net the same fate 
as the native courts. (89)
The slow growth of the system waa not due to local 
resistance (based on the taxation it necessitated, and a
continuation of old power rivalries within villages such as 
lay behind the Navuneram incident) but due to Hasluck's 
gradualist policies which enforced the principle of 
voluntary participation in the councils. (90) Ignoring 
widespread discontent, Hasluck maintained that
"political activity is of far less concern to the 
people themselves than health, education or 
economic progress". (9 1)
and that the nature of Papua New Guinea society
necessitated slow growth:
"The forbidding topography, sparcity of population and 
lack of common interest throughout the territory have 
resulted in marked political fragmentation, a pattern 
of independent village groups and a bewildering 
number of dialects, all of which continue to militate 
against the introduction of local government". (9 2)
Instead of unifying native people, Hasluck's councils meant
"divide-and-rule", as Hasluck believed that local conditions
militated against the growth of larger administrative units
such as regional councils. (93) Murray had used the same
argument to prevent the formation of councils based on the
principles of indirect rule in his period.
The council system was strangled at birth by its concept: 
as simply an organ of central administration. On the Austral; 
model, the councils had little power and such functions as th< 
could perform were rigidly defined. (94) Along with the tigl
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supervision of the District Officer at council meetings, the 
way they were organised (95) and the lack of finance from 
central government, it is no wonder that many prominent native
regarded the Councils as impotent. (96) Consultation was 
denied by the tight administrative control over the councils.
(97) The reality of the councils is even more laughable when 
one considers Hasluck's belief that they were political 
training centres for natives and would form the basis of 
further political activity:
"Insofar as it entails working upwards from the village 
population, the system of village councils is slower 
than one which concentrates on the advancement of an 
educated elite only, but, because it means education 
in citizenship for the people as a whole, the gains 
it makes are more likely to be sound". (98)
Hasluck's councils were merely an extension of Hurray's system
of village councillors, and were equally powerless.
Hasluck preferred Murray's grassroots approach to 
government participation by natives because of his fear 
of a political elite and his policy of "uniform develojment" 
which meant that native participation in government had to be 
at the lowest level. Murray had set down this policy when he 
wro te:
"in another generation the lower positions in the 
Government service will be largely filled by natives".
(99)
and when he set up native Assessors to take over the lowest 
judicial positions.
These ideas formed the basis of Hasluck's educational 
policy which put into practice Murray's statement in his 
1937 Annual Report:
"I am quite opposed to the development of a Papuan 
intelligentsia, and would rather ai,m at the diffusion 
of an elementary education, with a knowledge of 
English, as far as possible". (100)
tsluck opposed the establishment of secondary or tertiary 
education, as it would, he believed, lead to the creation 
of an intellectual elite. He feared such an elite, not on 
the grounds of racism on which Murray had opposed it, but 
because he regarded them as potential "native demagogues" 
who would become politically aware and constitute a threat 
to continued Australian political rule and white domination 
in the Territory:
"Already we face a situation where a small minority of 
the people might be regarded as advanced while the 
majority are still living in a primitive state. This 
situation is one 7.hich gives unusual and dangerous 
opportunities for the native demagogue who claims on 
behalf of himself or of a minority rights and 
privileges which should belong to the whole of the 
people. It is also one that requires us to call on 
the advanced native people to accept with patience 
and moderation & wider good for the whole of the 
people rather than an early serving of their own 
sectional advantages. Vie sometimes talk of an 
•elite’ and our own special responsibility to it.
They need to earn that title by the standards they 
set themselves". (101)
Education was assimilatory, based on Murray's belief that 
education should "civilise" the native. The teaching of the 
English language and Christianity became the main aims of 
primary education, along with the vague "blending of cultures", 
by which Hasluck meant not a blending at all but total 
assimilation:
"to change from the social habits and customs of a 
primitive society to those of a civilised society". (102)
However, Hasluck1s fear of an elite prevented natives
from becoming totally assimilated and assuming responsible
positions In politics and administration: thus Murray's
vicious circle was perpetuated. This contradiction was
necessitated by Murray and Hasluck's racism: because they
believed in white supremacy and native innate inferiority,
they were forced into a policy of grassroots assimilation
which resulted in neither assimilation nor association.
Hasluck's educational policy meant that in the 1960’s there
were no natives who could assume responsibility in posts
which required more than basic literacy, thus no localization
could be effective and the emerging political leaders lacked
experience. (103)
Like Uurray, Hasluck supported white settlement in the fora
of Australian business interests, whom he believed would be
given the dominant role in the "development" of the territory.
(104) He too believed that native economic participation would
take the form, chiefly, of labour on white plantations, and
mistrusted the co-operatives. He wrote:
"the natives will be able to engage in economic 
activities as soon as their economic interest is 
awakened and they have achieved the capacity to 
do so". (105)
Native economic schemes lacked finance and protection and 
guidance by the government, and Hasluck's policy of government 
encouragement of expatriates (which Murray had begun in 1906) 
ruled out this possibility. (106) Hasluck assumed that 
natives in industry would have very subordinate roles (10 7)
and in agriculture he wanted natives to become small 
freeholders producing cash crops, identical to the Australian 
model. (10 8) Ke provided no means whatsoever for this to 
happen, however, and dismissed the thought that such a 
change would cause massive social problems:
"there will have to be major movements of people, 
involving hundreds of thousands of people, if we 
are all to have a higher standard of living". (109)
This was the opposite of MacGregor's humane refusal to
dispossess natives of their land.
Hasluck's policy of white development, which he 
continued from the Murray period, retarded native economic 
development, and by creating a class with vested interests 
in the status quo (that is, in maintaining Australian 
monopoly in economic, political and administrative fields) 
created barriers to independence.
MacGregor's aim of establishing a system of indirect 
rule in British New Guinea was forced into the background, 
after the failure of his native magistrates system, by the 
unfavourable conditions under which he worked and the pressui 
upon him by the Queensland Government to extend his 
administration. His humane concern for native welfare 
determined all his policies. Murray rejected MacGregor's 
aim in the form of a direct, police rule based on the 
belief that the native was innately inferior and should be 
given no responsibility in administration. His policy of 
grassroots assimilation was continued by Hasluck in the 
form of the concept of uniform development, which was
founded on the old Murray assumptions. Hasiuck'a native 
administration was identical to that of liurray in aisa, 
assumptions and practice. Consultation was denied in 
his local government councils, and hia education aysten, 
based on a fear of a native elite, meant that effective 
self-government was retarded indefinitely.
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